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Flat-rate deposit  insurance, combined with limited liability,
encourages  banks  - especially  poorly capitalized  banks  - to
gamble with depositors' money.  A bank's heavy exposure in
developing country debt increases the secondary market price;
strong bank capitalization decreases it.
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Bank  loans  to many  developing  countries  trade  the  largest  U.S.  banks  increases  discounts  by
at a discount  on  the  secondary  market.  These  nearly  25  cents  on  the  dollar.
discounts  are  typically  assumed  to reflect  only
the  repayment  prospects  of  the borrower  country.  They  explain  their  results  with  a simulation
model  of  a representative  bank  with  minimum
But  Ozler  and  Huizinga  demonstrate  that  capital  requirements,  flat-rate  deposit  insurance,
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There  is  a strong  negative  correlation  secondary  market.
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country  reduces  the  discount  10 to  15 cents  on  choose  a more  heavily  concentrated  developing
the dollar.  country  loan  ponfolio.  Similarly,  poorly  capital-
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'Fhey also  find  that discounts  and  total  bank  than  well-capitalized  banks  do  fromii a risky
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In the secondarv  mark.) for  developing countrv debt, bank loans to manv
countries trade_,at  a discount.  The discounts are tvpically  assumed to
reflect  onlv the repavmernt  prospects of the  borrower countries.  In fact,
secondary  market prices are taken  as a guide in  discussions of the possible
debt relief  and valuation problems associated  with developing country  debt
(for  example see Borensztein  and Pennacchi (1989)).  Actual debt-reduction
schemes such as the offer of the Philippines  to repurchase  between $1.2
billion and $1.4 billion of its own debt, have also been guided  by secondary
market prices (VSJ, September 18, 1989).  To the extent that secondary
market prices are svstematically  affected  by factors  other than  countries'
repayment prospects,  however, debt relief  or buyback decisions  bas6d on just
the secondarv  market prices will be contaminated  and misguided.
In this paper we demonstrate that creditor  country factors  have a major
impact  on secondary  market prices.  Our empirical investigation  suggests  a
systematic  relationship  between secondary  market prices and the size
distribution of banks' portfolios.  Large U.S. banks' exposures to
developing countries  and discounts in the secondary market are found to be
strongly  negatively correlated,  even when borrower characteristics  and the
size  of the  market are controlled for.  The magnitude of this effect is
substantial:  a four  billion U'.S.$ increase in the exposure of the large
banks to a country is  estimated to reduce the discount 10-15 cents on the
dollar.  The empirical investigation  also suggests that discounts and bank
capital aggregates are strongly positively  related over time: an eight
billion U.S. $ increase in the capital of largest  U.S. banks is found to
increase  di;counts  bv near 25 cents on the dollar.
An explanation for the  empirical results is provided with the aid of a2
simulatiori  model.  The model is  of a representative  bank that faces  minimum
capital requirement, flat rate dcposit insurance,  and lirited liability.
The bank's port4olio adjustment decision involves trading risky foreign
loans in tte secondarv  market and making short term  domestic loans.  The
model vields a negative relationship  between  banks' exposure to developing
countries  and the discounts in the secondary  market.  This is  because  flat
rate deposit ins.rance,  combined  with limited liability,  encourages  banks to
gamble with depositors'  money, and to choose a more heavily concentrated
developing  country loan portfolio.  Similarly, poorly capitalized banks that
enjoy deposit insurance  benefit more from a risky developing  country loan
portfolio than  well capitalized banks.
The model is simulated  by holding default probabilities of countries
equal so as to focus  on creditor country factors that  affect secondary
market prices.  Simulations  permit us to  calculate, for example, that an
increase in the coverage of deposit insurance from 0% to 75%.results in
higher discounts by 5 cents on the dollar for large countries (based  on 1985
parameter values and the assumption of .5  default probability for all
developing countries).  A thirty percent increase  of bank capital leads to a
12 cent increase  of the discount for the large countries.  In addition, the
simulations  suggest near 3.5  billion expected loss for the federal deposit
insurance  agency.  Finallv,  the magnitude of the impact of exposure
distribution on secondary  market prices are found to  be consistent with our
empirical estimations.
A  competing  explanation for the observed negative relationship  between
bank exposure and secondarv market discounts stems from the behavior of the
multilateral lending  agencies and the large creditor country governments.
It mav be argued that these institutions  provide implicit subsidy to the3
banks  in  order  to  avoid  financial  instability.  Loans  from  these
institutions  to  large  borrowers  would  presumably  enhance  repayment  prospects
of these  borrowers,  which  could  explain  why  their  debt  trades  at lower
discounts.  While  we can  not  rule  out  that  differential  treatment  by
multilateral  lending  agencies  affects  secondary  market  prices,  we show
empirically  that  the  presence  of deposit  insurance  agency  renders  the
relationship  between  stock  market  value  and  bank  exposure  convex. This
result  lends  additional  credence  for  our  explanation  of  cross  country
differences  in  secondary  market  prices.
Overall,  we demonstrate  that  creditor  country  factors  such  as the
compositions  of  banks'  developing  country  loan  portfolios,  and the
regulatory  environment  are  significant  determinants  of secondary  market
prices. These  findings  have two  important  policy  implications.  First,  our
findings  undermine  the  argument  for  using  secondary  market  prices  as
guidelines  for  possible  debt  relief  to  developing  countries,  as it is
arbitrary  to render  debt  forgiveness  dependent  on the  particulars  of
creditor  country  financial  institutions  and  bank  regulation.  The second
policy  implication  of  our  findings  concerns  debt  buybacks.  In several  recent
papers  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988  a,b)  have  argued  that  debt  buybacks  may  be
harmful  to  the  debtor  country  because  the  country  ends  up paying  the  average
market  price  to retire  marginal  debt. The  presence  of deposit  insurance
strengthens  the  argument  that  the  country  (in  particular  a large  exposure
country)  pays  too  much,  since  the  market  price  now reflects  the  average
payment  per  dollar  of debt  from  the  country,  as  well  as an expected  payment
from  the  deposit  insurance  agency.
Finally,  the  finding  that  countries  that  buy  back debt  have  to pay  a
premium  over  expected  future  repayment  is  consistent  with  Krugman  (1990)  who4
argues  that  depos  insurance  biases  the  banks  against  providing  debt
relief. Both  straight  debt  relief,  which  affects  a country's  adjustment
effort,  and  deit.buybacks  tend  to lower  the  value  of the  banks'  contingent
claim  on the  deposit  insurance  agency. Our  empirical  evidence suggests
that  heavily  indebted  countries  will  experience  irore  difficulty  obtaining
debt  relief  or  repurchasing  their  debt  than  lightly  indebted  countries  and
that  heavily  exposed  banks  will  be more  biased  against  debt  releif  and
repurchases  than  lightly  exposed  banks.
The  remainder  of this  paper  is  organized  as follows. Section  2
contains  the  empirical  evidence. We present  the  model  in  Section  3,  and
also  discuss  the  simulation  results,  and  their  implications  for  bank
regulatory  practice. Section  4  presents  evidence  on  banks'  stock  market
valuation. Section  5  contains  a summary  and  conclusions.
2.  Does  Bank  Exposure  Affect  Secondary  Market  Prices  ?
2.1  A  Cursory  Inspection  of  the  Data
While  the  debt  obligations  of a  number  of d:eveloping  countries  are
being  traded  at large  discounts,  there  are  several  developing  countries  with
debt  that  appears  to  be at  par. In this  section  we will first  present  some
distinguishing  characteristics  of the  two  groups  of  countries. Second,
discount  and  bank  exposure  data  are  presented  for  the  countries  for  which
debt  is  traded  at a discount.
A cursory  look  at the  data  suggests  that  the  debt  of countries  with  bad
repayment  prospects  is  more  likely  to be traded  at a discount  in the
secondary  market. Repsyment  prospects  of countries  have typically  been
measured  by their  general  economic  chararacteristics.  Economic
characteristics  of  borrowers  that  are  identified  as important  measures  of5
risk  have  been  employed  in  a  wide range  cf empirical  studies  concerning
developing  country  debt:  predicting  thb  occurence  of repayments
difficulties,  as well  as investigating  credit  terms  (for  rev jws  see
McDonough  (1982),  Eaton  and  Taylor  (1986);  recent  studies  include  Ozler
(1990  a b)), and in  the  analysis  of secondary  market  prices  (Berg  and  Sachs
(1989),  Cohen  (1988),  Hajivassiliou  (1988),  Huizinga  (1989),  Sachs  and
Huizinga  (1987),  and  Purcell  and  Orlanski  (1988)).  We employ  variables
similar  to the  ones  employed  in  the  previous  studies  and  these  variables
are:  debt-to-exports  ratio,  reserves-to-imports  ratio,  real  GNP  per  capita,
lagged  value  of investment-to-GNP-ratio,  rate  of inflation,  debt-to-GN?
ratio,  imports-to  GNP-ratio,  and  reserves-to-GNP  ratio  ratio. In  addition
to  these  standard  indicators,  some  structural  variables  have  also  been
considered.  These  include  the  share  of agriculture  in  GDP  and  a measure  of
income  distribution.  A lower  agricultural  base  and  unequal  income  distribu-
tion  are  both  argued  to  contribute  to  political  instability  and  therefore  a
less  favorable  environment  for  timely  repayment.
In  Table  I  the  means  and  standard  errors  of the  repayment  -ndicators
for  the  countries  in  our  sample  are  presented.  Our  data  contains  informa-
tion  on  46 developing  countries  for  the  period  of 1986-88. The  debt  of  25
countries  was  traded  at a  discount. Overall,  the  repayment  indicators
appear  worse  for  these  25  countries. Furthermore,  almost  all  of the
countries  in  this  group  have  had  rescheduling  agreements  with  their  creditor
banks,  in  contrast  to  the  remaining  group  with  almost  no reschedulings. 2
Table  1  also  indicates  that  the  countries  with  debts  that  are traded  at
a discount  have  larger  debt  outstanding  to  private  creditors.  A closet
inspection  of this  variable  for  countries  that  are  not in  the  traded  group
is  instructive.  In this  group  countries  that  may  be judged  to  have good6
repayment  prospects  have larger  outstanding  debt  to  private  creditors:  near
16  billion  real  U.S.  dollars  for  Korea  and  near  b billion  1986  U.S.  dollars
for  Greece. In  cOhtrast, countries  with  relatively  bad  repayment  prospects
also appear  in  this  group,  such  as Ethiopia,  and  Trinidad-and-Tobago.  Debt
to  private  creditors  are .08  b.llion  real  U.S.  dollars,  and .19  billion  real
U.S.  dollars  for  Ethiopia  and  Trinidad-and-Tobago  respectively.  One
plausible  suggestion  drawn  from  these  observations  is  that  transaction  costs
of trading  private  debt in  the  secondary  market,  prevents  trading  for
countries  with  small  amount  of  private  debt.
Table  2  presents  some  summary  information  concerning  the  secondary
market  discounts  for  the  25  countries  whose  debt  was traded  at a  discount  in
the  market  and  bank  exposures  for  the  1986-88  period. The  discounts
presented  in  this  table  are  calculated  using  bid  prices. The  mean  discount
for  all  countries  over  the  period  1986-88  is  54.24  (with  a standard
deviation  of 24.24)  and  the  mean  exposure  is  $U.S.  2.28  billion  (with  a
standard  deviation  of $4.11  billion).  A cursory  inspection  of the  data,  on
a  country  by country  basis,  shows  that  small  borrowers,  such  as  Bolivia,
Liberia,  and  Sudan,  trade  at rather  large  discounts,  in  contrast  to the
larger  borrowers.
Another  interesting  feature  of  Table  2 is  the  pattern  of the  secondary
market  spreads,  calculated  as the  percentage  differences  between  the  offer
and  bid  prices  quoted  in  the  secondary  market. For  countries  with large
discounts,  spreads  are  also  quite  large,  suggesting  that  an investigation  of
bid  prices  only  may  be misleading.2.2  Empiricai  Specifica ion
Trading of loans  at a discount in the secondarv  market have taken  place
onlv for some of.r.he  indebted  countries.  As the  discussion in the data
section indicates,  on average those  countries are 1ess creditworthy  and they
have larger  private debt.  Accordinglv.  define  T* as follows (for
convenience time  and country indicators  are omitted):
(1)  T  - :  X  + u
where T  - a latent variable such that, if  T* >  0 then  we observe trading
at a discount in the secondary  market,  but if  T* <-O then we do
not observe trading at a discurnt in the secondary  market,
- variables that determine the occurrance of trading in the
secondary market, including repayment indicators  and the
magnitude of debt to private creditors,
uI-  normally distributed  error term  with standard error a1
The magnititude of discounts  has been shown to  be related to
creditworthiness  indicators.  In addition, as posited in this paper, the
discounts are expected to be influenced  by bank exposure and capitalization
rates  as described  below:
(2)  D* - -y O'  +  u2
where  D* - discount in the secondary  market,
O' - in addition to the variables in 0  bank exposure and bank
capital are included,
U2  normally distributed  random error term  with a standard error a2
However, we observe  positive discounts only when T* >  0,  and the debt
appears to be at par otherwiseD - D*  if  T* >O.
_T  - 0  ott,eerise.
It is  well  known  that if the sample  is  censored,  as  it is  here,
employing  data  only  for  those  countries  with  positive  -'iscounts  and  using
least  squares  method  to  estimate  an equation  described  as in (2)  ,ields
biased  and inconsistent  parameter  estimates.  Alternatively,  one  may  employ
all  the  observations  by assigning  zeros  to  those  countries  for  which
positive  discounts  are  not  recorded,  and  employ  least  squares  method. This
approach  implies  that  if  the  debt  of those  countries  were  traded,  th"
secondary  market  price  would  be zero,  which  obviously  is incorrect.
Accordingly,  we employ  a censored  regression  estimation  technique  as
discussed  next.
The  model  described  above  is  a  Tobit  model  (Tobin  1958)  (type  two  Tobit
model  according  to the  classification  of  Amemiya  (1984)).  The standard
Tobit  model  is  a special  case  of the  model  where  T* - D*.  It  has  been
shown  that  Heckman's  two-step  estimator  (Heckman  1976)  can  be used in  this
type  of a  model  (Amemiya  (1984))  and  that  it  yields  consistent  parameter
estimates.  According  to  this  method,  one  first  estimates  the  probit  model
described  in  equation  (1)  using  maximum-likelihood  procedure  and  obtains  the
inverse  Mills'  ratio  (or  the  hazard  rate).3  The  second  stage equation  is:
(3)  D - y  O'  +  yIA  +  e2 for  D >  0.
where  X - inverse  of the  Mills'  ratio  (hazard  rate),
e2  - error term  with mean zero.
Equation  (3)  is  estimated  after  replacing  A with its  estimated  vc.lue  form9
equation  (1),  and  using  ordinary  least  squares  method.  The  problem  with  this
approach  is that,  the  asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix  of the  Heckman
estimator  is  notScQnsistent.5 It  has  been  pointed  out  by Lee  (1982),
however,  that  consistent  estimates  of the  variance  covariance  matrix  can  be
obtained  by applying  an  estimator  similar  tho  the  heteroskedasticity
consistent  estimator  developed  by White  (1980). Accordingly,  in this  paper
we  use  Heckman's  two  step  estimator  and  follow  the  idea  of  Lee (1982)  so  as
to  obtain  consistent  estimates  of  equation  (3).
2.3  Estimation  Results
In this  section  we present  results  from  the  estimations  of the  equations
described  in  the  previous  section:  the  probit  specification  for  the
occurrence  of trading  in  tha  secondary  market  as in  equation  (1),  and  the
secondary  market  discounts  specified  as  a Heckman  equation  as in (3). The
primary  result  of  our  empirical  investigation  is: holding  repayment
prospects  of the  borrowers  constant,  the  discount  in  the  secondary  market
decreases  with increased  bank  exposure.
In  order  to investigate  the  robustness  of these  results  we attempted  a
number  of alternative  specifications  for  the  two  equations.  Two issues
require  attention. First,  it is  important  to  establish  that  the  results  are
not  a consequence  of a  particular  choice  of economic  indicators  as  measures
of country  risk  among  the  potential  ones. Second,  the  results  should  not  be
contaminated  by specific  market  characteristics  such  as its  size. In order
to  address  the  first  potential  problem  we employed  alternative  specifica-
tions  of country  characteristics.  To address  the  second  source  of concern,
we calculated  the  discounts  as  averages  of  bid  and  ask  prices  in the
secondary  markets,  alternativcly  we employed  lagged  values  of spreads  as anexpEallatorv  variable in a specification  where the discounts are calculated
trorn  the bid prices onlv.
In  Tables 3-4.we  preseot estimation results for two primary empirical
m:odels,  with five different  speficatiors  each for the probit as well as the
Heckman equations.  The second stage equations differ from the probit
equations  bv the inclusion  of bank exposure and bank capital variables.  We
next describe the differences  between these  models and va-ious
specifications:  (In addition  to the variables that are described below,
each specification  employs region-specific  and quarterly dummy  variables.)
Model 1 (presented  in tables 3-4)  specification (1) incorporates the
following  variables:  stock  of debt to private creditors,  debt-to-exports,
reserves-to-imports  ratios,  real GNP per capita, the inflation rate and the
ratio  of countrv exposure to bank capital.  Specifications  2-4 differ from 1
primarily  by inclusion  of investment-to-gnp  ratio, a measure of income
distribution,  and share  of agriculture in gdp, respectively.  Specification
5, is like specification  1, but the dependent  variable is the discount
calculated  using only the bid price.  In addition, in specification  5, the
lagged  value of the spread between  bid and ask prices is incorporated  as an
explanotory  variable.  Model 2 (presented  in tables 5-6)  primarily replaces
debt-to-exports  and reserves-to-imports  by debt-to-GNP, imports-to-  GNP, and
reserves-to-GNP.  Alternative specifications  of Model 2 are structured
analogous to the alternatives of Model 1.6
Table 3 shows that  higher debt to exports ratio,  higher inflation,
lower  GNP per capita, and lower reserves to imports ratio increase the like-
lihood that, debt of a country is traded  at a discount in the secondary
market.  'The  estimated probabilities  of trading are large for all  the
countries, for which their is trading and thev drop dramatically for theremaining  countries.)  The amount of debt outstanding to private creditors
increase  the likelihood  of trading.
Table 4 indficates  that,  with the exception  of the income  distributiun
variable, variables that contribute towards the  occurence of trade, increase
the magnititude  of discounts; the  variables that decrease the likelihood  of
trading  decrease the magnititude  of discounts.  The sign of the agriculture
to gdp ratio is consistent  with Berg and Sachs (1989).  The sign of the
income  distribution  variable, however,  differs from that of  Berg and Sachs:
we find that the  debt of countries with historically  worse income
distribution  were traded  at lower discounts in the secondary  market.  The
bank exposure is found to be negatively related to the  discouts.
Table 5  indicates  that  GNP per capita and inflation  rates continue to
hold the same signs as in Tables 3-4,  and they remain important  determinants
of trading.  Higher reserves- to-GNP,  higher imports-to-GNP,  higher debt
service  payments to exports ratio all reduce the likelihood  of trading.
Higher debt-to-GNP  ratio is shown to increase  the likelihood  of trading.
Estimated  probabilities from all these  specifications  also seem reasonable
in that  actual no-trading countries  are assigned quite low probabilities of
being traded, in contrast to the remaining countries.  The discount equation
estimations for this model are presented in  Table 6.  Except for income
distribution  all the  variables continue to hold the same signs as in  Table
5.  As in  Model 1,  worsened income  distribution is found to contribute to
increased  probability  of trading  but it appears to reduce the discounts.
Exposure  variable is found to be negatively related to the discounts.
Overall, the signs of repavment indicators  are consistent with their
expected signs:  high debt ratio for a given amount of penalty for non-
pavment makes default more likelv.  The negative sign of reserves to gnp12
ratio suggest that it is  an indicator  of the level  of international
liquiditv  of the  borrower. A  high  ratio  of imports  to  gnp  makes  the
borrower  more.  cteditworthv,  since  the  borrower  becomes  more  vulnerable  to
trade  embargos. High inflation  appears  to  be  an indicator  of  a larger
probability  of  balance  of payments  crisis. Finally,  countries  with  high  gnp
per  capita  are  found  to  be more  creditworthy.
It  is important  to  note  several  other  specifications  to confirm  the
robustness  of our  findings. First, our  findings  are  not  a  consequence  of  a
few  extraordinarily  influential  observations.  Specifically,  if  Mexico  and
Brazil  (the  largest  two  ex:posure  countries)  are  deleted  from  the  sample  all
the  findings  continue  to  hold.  Second,  our  findings  continue  to  hold  even
when  we control  for  the  size  of the  country. To control  for  the  size  of the
country  we have  replaced  the  per  capita  real  gnp  with  real  gnp.
Two  important  findings  that  emerge  from  these  tables  are important
findings  of this  paper: First,  independent  of the  specific  form  employed  to
control  for  repayment  prospects  of the  borrowers,  the  exposure  of  banks  to  a
country  continues  to  hold  an important  role  in  determining  the  magnitude  of
secondary  market  discounts. In  particular,  high  bank  exposure  to a country
leads  to smaller  secondary  market  discounts. The  elasticity  of discounts
with  respect  ot  bank  exposure  is  10-15  percent  in  most  specifications.
Second,  we find  that  increased  bank  capital  increases  the  secondary  market
discounts.  The  magnititude  of this  impact  is  substantial:  near  25  cents  on
the  dollar  for  8  billion  U.S.  $.  (It  is  also  important  to  note  that  when
the  exposure,  and  capital  of the  largest  24  U.S.  banks  are  employed,  instead
of the  largest  9  banks,  the  results  we obtain  are  very  similar  to the  ones
reported  in  Tables  3-6.)13
3.  How Does DeRosit Insurance  Affect Secondary Market  Prices ?
3.1 A Model
This secti6ot-presents  a model of the influence  of deposit insurance  on
the pricing of developing  country debt.  In particular, the model examines
how a representative  bank that  can trade in the secondary  market and that is
subject to deposit insurance,  capital requirements  and accepted accounting
principals.  Subsequently, the model is simulated  by using exposure data for
the largest  U.S. banks.
In this two period model, the  bank's loan  portfolio consists of two kinds
f
of loans:  domestic and foreign.  The bank's exposure to country i,  Lt,  is
long term and given by history in the first period.  Country i defaults with
probability  n d, in  which case the  bank will not receive any payment from
the country.  In case of no default, foreign  loans pay the principal and the
f  h
foreign interest  rate  r.  . The domestic loan portfolio, denoted  L ,  is
h
short-term  yielding a certain domestic  return  r . The bank can adjust its
domestic loan portfolio  by making new loans in the first period, and adjust
its foreign loan  portfolio by engaging in trading in the secondary markets.
Deposits, denoted D, are assumed to  be partly insured  by a deposit
8
insurance  agency and the deposit  holders are risk neutral . The average,
e9
effective interest  rate, r ,  that  banks have to pay to attract deposits is:
(4)  re  dsr  +  duru
where, dS and du are the shares of insured  and uninsured deposits, and rs
and r  are the safe interest  rate and the rate on uninsured deposits
respectively.
Assuming that the  bank will be closed in the future period if the'alue of the bank's assets is less than the value of its liabilities,  the
future  value of the bank is described  below:
k5)  B - (hr  )Lh  +  V - (l+re)D  if  V +  V  >0
-0  otherwise,
where  V*  (+r  h)L  h  (+re)D.
V- expost value of foreign loan exposure.
The bank's capital, denoted  K ,  is asssumed to be given, and the
regulators  impose minimum capital requirements  on domestic and foreign loans
denoted 9h and 6 ,  respectively.
Let us now turn to the  buying and selling decisions of a bank that
observes a secondarv  market price P. for a  dollar of debt of country i.  If
the bank decides to sell the debt of a country,  which is kept at face value
on the  books, then the bank realizes  a holding loss.  This is because the
current regulations require the  bank to  write down all the previously
acquired loans to this countrv.  Realized holding losses reduce regulatory
capital  K.  A reduction  of regulatory  capital losses forces the bank to
curtail its domestic loan activities.  If these activities are very
rewarding, i.e. if the spread between domestic loan and deposit rates is
verv large, then such a write down is prohibitively  unprofitable.12  Thus
banks' ability to carry developing  country debt at face value effectively
prevents sell offs of these loans.
A bank that buys developing  country debt can carry its debt at market
value without a write down of any previously acquired loans.  Despite this
favorable  accounting treatment of debt purchases, banks can only expand
their  portfolio's in any direction to the  extent that they  have excess15
regulatory  capital.  In the remainder  of this section,  we assume that the
bank has one dollar of excess capital,  which clearly restricts the  bank's
demand for develo;ng  countrv  debt.  The bank is assumed to be interested  in
maximizing expected bank value in the second  period.  Secondary market
prices a bank is willing to pay are then determined  competitively  by the
condition that the  bank can increase  expected bank value equally by
expanding its portfolio by purchasing loans to any country or by expanding
its domestic loan porfolio. 13
To determine what developing  country debt is  worth to the bank it has
to calculate the probabilities  of states  of nature in  which holding this
debt is going to contribute towards  the value of the  bank.  These
probabilities  crucially depend on the relative size of banks' exposure to
developing countries.  This is  because the  bank's exposure to country j  can
only be worth something to the bank in the next period in those states of
nature where any losses the  bank sustains on its other developing country
exposure are not large  enough to bankrupt the bank.  Accordingly,  define
itf  to be the  probability that loans to country i  contribute something to
the value of the bank:
(6)  ?.f  - Prob  [V  +  (l+rf)Lf  +  V-i  >  0]  i - 1,..,n
where  V  - the ex post value of the bank's foreign loan portfolio,
excluding the  bank's exposure to country j.
Conditional on the bank surviving if the  country pays, the bank may continue
to survive even if the country does not pay.  The probability of this event
is denotedf  with  I  f  14
is denoted  with  i  where  wi.-  prob  (V  +  V  i  . > 0).
Suppose the bank changes its  balance sheet by using one dollar of16
capital to purchase loans in the secondary  market.  The purchase leads to
f two  effects on expected  bank value.  First is a direct effect, denoted  bi,
that  holds r  e Qatnstant  as below:
f  if  (1_Xd)  [l  _  (I  -1)(l+r  d)]  _  xd f'  f  - (l  +re)
I  L6%~~~  fp  f  i  i  af
i
The  second  effect  of the  purchase  on the  bank  value  is  the  interest
effect  through  the  adjustment  of r . To see  this  define S  i  as the  surplus
generated  from  purchasing  loans  in  the  secondary  market,  to  be divided
between  the  bank  and  the  deposit  insurance  agency  (note  that  depositors  on
15 average  require  a return  rs)  . If  all  deposits  are  uninsured  then  the
expected  gain  to  the  bank  is  all  of the  surplus  Sf  16  In contrast,  if  all
deposits  are  insured,  then re  _ rS  and  the  bank  gains bf  as in (7). i
Accordingly,  if  part  of deposits  are  insured,  the  expected  gain  taking  into
account  both  the  direct  balance  sheet  and  indirect  interest  rate  effects  is:
(8)  b.' - (l-d )  bf +  du S.
Analogously,  define  h  to  be the  probability  that  one  additional
do1lar  of  domestic  loans  is  going  to  contribute  something  to the  future
value  of the  bank,  and  b '  to  be the  expected  gain  from  allocating  one
dollar  capital  to  backing  domestic  loans.
For  the  case  where  the  bank  holds  domestic  loans  as  well as loans  to
all  n  countries  and  the  capital  requirement  is  binding,  the  optimality
conditions  require  that b  f'-  bh,  for  all i.17 Accordingly,  Pi  is
implicitly  defined  as a function  of all  the  exogenous  variables,  in
particular  capital  requirements,  the  bank's  capital,  the  total  size11'
distribution  of developing  countrY loan portfolio, the  country's default
probabilities, the given interet rates and the extent  of deposit insurance.
3.2  Simurttion  Method
To simulate the model described in the previous section,  we need to
compute  Ih  Ifw  and  Xi  A direct method for implementing  this  model h  i  i  .
involves  considering  every possible outcome (i.e.,  every permutation of
countries and defaults/payments),  each weighted by its probability, and  the
fraction  of successful  outcomes.  This method is unsuitable for a large
sample  of  N  countries, because the number of outcomes to be considered is
N 2 . To overcome this obstacle, we employ an algorithm for a large  but
finite  number of representative  outcomes, taking advantage  of the law of
large numbers to ensure accuracy of the results.
The algorithim is a very simple Monte Carlo procedure:  A represen-
tative event is generated  by obtaining a default/payment  from each country
according to the following rule:
(9)  RND <  ird  implies  default,
where  RND - a random  number on the (0,1) interval.
Accordingly, the outcome (bank failure  or solvency)  of the event is
determined  by summing the payments from all nondefaulting  countries, i.e.,
computing  V,  and comparing it with  V  . This procedure is repeated m
times, to obtain as many events as are desired for statistical  precision in
the ratio of  successful  outcomes to total  events.  Typically, precise
results  are obtained  with m - 10  events runs, as judged by the reproduc-
ability from run ro run. (This in accordance  with the law of large numbers,
which suggests relative  precision approaches  m l/2.)  Similarly, to obtain18
ff countrv-specific information  on  Yr.  and  ?i  the algorithm actually used
is extended from (9) above to  compute modified bank-failure  prok-'  :lities
conditional upon-pavment  of the ith country.
3.3  Si;.iulation  Results
The method just described is employed to simulate the model.  In all
the simulations,  default probabilities  of countries  are assumed to be equal
to focus on the impact  of exposure distribution.  First, a benchmark case
(for 1985) is simulated.  Second, the following  alternative scenarios are
considered:  an increase in the default probability of countries, a decrease
in  banks' capital, an increase in miniimum  capital requirements, and an
increase  in the share of insured  deposits.
The results of the benchmark simulation and the  parameter values are in
Table 5 colomn (1).  Secondary market prices are positively related to the
extent of the country's  bank indebtedness  as is consistent  with our
empirical findings (prices  range from about  49.9 cents for the smallest
debtors to 54.4 cents for Brazil).  The probability of the  bank's survival
is 88.9%, the expected  value of the  bank  is roughly $19.9  billion, and the
expected loss of the deposit insurance  agency loss is about $3.5 billion.
d
An increase of the default probability,  n  ,  from 0.50 to 0.70
significantly  decreases the bank's chance of survival to 55.7% (column  2).
The bank's expected value is reduced, the deposit agency's loss is
augmented,  and secondary  market prices decrease.
Second,  we consider a reduction  of the amount of bank capital the  bank
can loose  before it is closed, as presented in coulumn 3.  This yields a
lower survival probability for the  bank, lower  expected future value of the
bank, and higher expected losses for the deposit agency.  Lower bank
capitalization  engenders  higher secondary market prices, reflecting the. !;  '.,:  ,  :  . '  ':  . '  z  '  t  '  t  '  r"  <\1  n  . t  v  'I  I
- ..  ii  t  .+,  . . 0  e  . '  :  Ofl:  e1  - '  :ip6l-  I..  .l1  j><t(.r!.
F.-..''.  <.:s:.  : 'i.i  - tt.i  mI.IlaPton resuits  for  the  case  wheret
:wr(ot  oihk-  (J',1(sits  *ire  i  u".lrt-d  t'  *his  instance,  it does  not  benefit  the
'bo.nk.  to  rvnder  '.  a  )ss.  pit'  oio  ri,'kier,  since  the  deposit  rates  it  has
to pa; to  attract deposits fully  refit'  the riskiness  of the asset
portfolio  Hence, secondary  mrarke-  prices for all countries are the same.  18
. Are the Results a Consequence of Implicit Insurance ?
The simulation  model shows that the existence  of a deposit insurance
s:stem  can explain the negative relationship  between bank exposure to a
countrv and the discount of its  debt in the secondary  market.  However, an
alternative  explanation mavbe based on the  behaviour of multilateral lending
agencies and creditor country  governments.19  Since  one  of  the  aims  of  these
institutions  is to increase the stability  of  the  creditor  country  banking
svsteas,  thev  are  more  I  ely  to  provide  lending  to  debtors  to  which  banks
are  more heavilv exposed.  In this  manner the third parties will be
enhancing the repavment prospects  of those  debtors, providing implicit
subsidy to the banks.  Accordingly, the positive relation  between  exposure
and  discounts  would  be  a mere reflection  of the enhanced r payment prospects
of the borrowers.
In  this  section  we  provide  evidence  that  support  the  view  that  explicit
guarantees  bv a  deposit  insurance  agencv  (FDIC)  have  an  impact  on  the
secondary  market  prices.  The  first  evidence.  somewhat  cursory  in  nature,  is
-he  time  trend  of  the  discounts  over  the  period  considered.  As  presented  in
Table  6.  average  discounts  increased  form  44.8  to  64.7  between  the  first-jA  r  )-  6  @'and  '  1ti.  .'i  j:-.,  I  t  of  1'4S8  Trhe  pat  tern  is  somewhat
,  r:  . j:  vc.t. ahat  a  r  :-::r!'r  rIt the borrowers, in  adrticular  majo!
borr''O'E'rS  ha'.'e-teE.  r'.iin,  net  tr.insfers  to  their creditors.  Ani explanation
for this pattern, that is  c'onsistent  with  the implicit insurance
explanation  mav, of course, he that net repayments  at present are not good
indicators  of future repayment  prospects.  Alternativelv, the time pattern
of the discounts could be a consequence of the strengthening  of the capital
position  of U.S. banks, which is consistent  with our model and empirical
estimates.
The second evidence which supports the FDIC explanation of the
relationship  between bank exposure and secondary  market prices, is provided
by an investigation  of stock market pricing of lender  banks.  U.S. banks
differ widelv in the  extent of their developing  country exposure and
capitalizat.on rates,  and thus the  banks faze  very different probabilities
of ever receiving any pavments from the FDIC.  The heavily exposed banks
thus have a more valuable contingent  claim on the FDIC, which to some extent
softens the negative impact  of developing  country exposure on bank
valuation.  W;e  next describe this  by expanding the  model of section 3.1.
As before, the bank carries domestic loans, Lh, and developing
f country debt, L  The bank has capital, K, and is subject to a binding
uniform capital requirement  such that K - 9 (Lh +  L  f).  Deposits D are equal
to Lh +  Lf - K from the bank's balance sheet, and there is partial deposit
insurance.  Let  6  be the realized future discount on developing country
debt, i.e.. the bank will receive 1-6 dollars for every dollar of developing
country debt.  The discount  6  is taken to be uniformlv distributed on [0,
6'.  where  6  s  i.  For simplicitv, assume that domestic and foreign loans
pav a contractual interest  of zero. and risk-neutral  deposit holders require,in  expecced return of zero a~.  1  In this setting,  we can derive the
lol.owing rtlation for the tc.'-c:ed  value, EB, of the  hanik
10)  E-  + L  for K >  6
L  h+Lf  LI +  L
Lf
- a'  h  L  )  )-6  #otherwise
where  Q  - -(1/2)S  is the mean discount  on developing country debt,
2
a' _ 9 /(25).
The above equation states that for high values of bank capital, bank
value is positive for any realization  of 6  and the relation between bank
value and exposure to developing countries  as a share of assets is linear. 20
In  contrast, for low  values of bank capital the bank can be bankrupted, and
hence the  bank has contingent  claims on the FDIC.  In this case, the
relation  between bank value and share of foreign  debt exposure  becomes
convex.  This is  because contingent claims  on FDIC softens the negative
impact  of developing country exposure on bank valuation. 21
We approximate the relation described in equation (10) by the
following  equation:
01)  -EB  - K  L+L  2
Lh +L  L  + L  I  + Lf
The hypothesis that  deposit insurance  matters corresponds to  a1 >  0.
Equation (11) is  estimated for 23 banks.  2  Data are for 1987 and the
L  variable captures the exposure of banks to four large Latin debtor
countries:  Argentina, Brazil,  Mexico, and Venezuela.23  The regression
results are reported in  Table (9) 24  The negative estimate of a0 ic.dicates^:--:  ~  ~  I  i  ,'''t  :  '  . t.S)}ti 1)
'l  it  .i  t  '  k  I:  ',  cI  a  ;  ' *'il  bo it sed  to  calIculate
LoW  ibank  va  'ue  is  at  Ic  td  O';  av  (o I  r'  ilc  rease  ot  developing  country
k-:9,p05'1r  Which  j  'In1  he  a'll  t'1  the  .arginal  discount.  The  evidence,  in
support  ot  the  FDIC  hvpothesis, indicates that  heavily exposed banks value
dv.eloping countrv debt more hit,hlv  at the  margin than the less exposed
banks (as reported in  Table 9)  The calculated marginal discounts are
consistent  with the trend that the smaller, regional  banks are more
aggressivelv  using the secondary  market to reduce their developing country
exposure.  The wide disparit; of marginal discounts also indicates that
There  are  large  profitable  trading  opportunities  for  interbank  trades,  as
U.S. banks  can  inicrease  their  combined  expected  claim  on  the  deposit
insurance  agency bv trading  developing country debt.
The varying valuation of developing countrv debt across banks cannot be
explained bv any differences in treatment of indebted  countries by national
governments  or multilateral lending  agencies that may give rise to differing
repa';ment  prospects across countries.  As banks tend to hold developing
countrv loan  portfolio's of more or less equal composition, such
differential treatment of countries can not explain different  valuation of
developing  country  debt  across  banks.2523
5.  Concluding  Remarks
This paper has empirically  demonstrated that secondary  market discounts
are negativelv_related  to banks' exposure to countries.  The evidence also
suggest that  discounts and bank capital are strongly  positively related over
time.  The results  are explained  with the aid of a simulation  model, which
incorporates  deposit insurance  combined  with limited  liability.  In this
model, secondary market pricing is  motivated by banks' desires to reshuffle
developing  cou -ry  loan portfolio's so as to increase the  value of their
implicit  elaim on the deposit insurance  agency.
The observed negative relationship  between between bank exposure and
secondary market discounts can also be explained  by the alternative
hypothesis that the multilateral lending agencies  and creditor country
governments tend to favor lending to the larger debtor countries.2  Our
evidence for a convex relation between stock market valuation of banks and
developing  country exposure, however, supports the view that contingent
claims on the deposit insurance  agency are important determinats  of
secondary  market prices.  The strong  positive correlation of discounts and
bank capital over time  is further evidence that is consistent  with the
explanation provided in this paper.
A main result of our model is that  bank regulation,  and in  particular
capital requirements,  can have repercussions for  prices in the secondary
market.  The model suggests that  a tightening  of capital standards can be
expected to increase secondary  market prices, as it forces domestic banks to
curtail potentially  profitable lending  activitities that can generate income
to serve as a buffer against bankruptcy.  Conversely, the sometimes applied
policy of capital forbearance  which is the loose  application of capital
reachivements provides  banks with a potential opportunity to earn their way24
back  to  solvency,  with  a negative  price  effect  on developing  country  debt.
Ovarall,  creditor  country  factors  such  as the  exposure  distribution  of
banks  portfoll  -ar,d  the  regulatory  environment  are  demonstrated  to  be
important  determinants  of secondary  market  prices.  These  findings
strengthen  the  arguments  that  buybacks  may  be harmful  to  countries  and
undermine  the  arguments  for  using  secondary  market  prices  as indicators  of a
country's  repayment  prospects. In addition,  our  evidence  supports  the  viev
that  deposit  insurance  biases  banks  against  providing  debt  relief.25
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Bulow and Rogoff (1988) result that the market price rises after a
buvback is nr-longer necessarily correct,  however, as after the buyback the
average expected pavout from the deposit insurance  agency may be reduced,
yielding a lower market price, even if the average expected payment per
dollar of debt from the country rises.
2See Ozler (1989) for empirical evidence on how reschedulings  have
affected bank value.
3From the estimation of (1)  one obtains w  and n,  where they are the
density and distribution functions  of the standard normal evaluated at
(h  O/ 01)  respectively.  The ratio w/l is the  hazard rate.
4Variance of f  isgiven  by eq. (89),  Amemiya(1984),  p32.
Heckman's method does no require the joint normality of D* and T*.
The detailed  discussion of the  method summarised  here and the underlying
assumptions  are in  Amemiya ppl3, and pp32-33.
6The only exception is specification (3).  Because of difficulties in
estimation,  debt to private creditors  has been left out for Model 2
specification (3)
7We have also the discount equation  bv ordinary least squares.  The
results  obtained for several of the specifications  appear similar.
As in Penati and Protopapadakis (1988),  these shares are determined
outside the model as the financing  decision of the commercial  banks is
beyond the scope of this paper.
9If the bank fails, then  uninsuredbdeposit  holders get a return  rb
and the  probability of bankruptcy is  E  . Since the depositors are risk
neutral the following relation  holds:  s  b  u  b b
r  l-  )r  +  ir  r
10Of course, banks are often closed before the  market value of assets
has decliued to the market value of liabilities.  The probability of bank-
ruptcy  w  is equivalent to the probabilitybthat  B  is zero.  The
bankrupcty case expected gross return  1 +  r  on uninsured deposits is the
expected  value of  h  h
[(l+r )L  +  V]/D.
t 1 At least in the short run, this is a reasonable assumption as it takes
time to build capital through retained  earnings or by floating new equity.
12In practice, banks that  have to retrench  may have to sell assets at
distress  prices which makes retrenchment  even more unpprofitable.28
13The  limitation  of  a  bank's  regulatory  capital  prevents  it from
heavily  skewing  its  portfolio  towards  holding  the  debt  of a single  debtor
country. Other  reasons  that  banks  do  not  specialize  in  one  country's  debt
are  restrictions  that  limit  a  bank's  exposure  to  any  one  borrower  to  a
maximum  of 15%..oj  bank  capital,  and  the  existence  of asymmetric  information
on the  part  of banks  regarding  certain  loans  to  especially  private  debtors
in  developing  countries  that  make  these  loans  untradeable.
Finally,  an important  reason  that  specialization  will  never  occur  is
that  such  specialization  would  endanger  the  health  of the  banks  and  thus  the
jobs  of the  managers  that  make  the  bank's  asset  allocation  decisions.
Generally,  managers  that  consider  restructuring  their  bank's  debt  portfolio
face  a trade  off  between  maximizing  bank  value  and  job  security. Consider
a  model  of identical  banks  that  hold  debt  to two  countries  and  that  are
controlled  by managers  interested  in  bank  vaule  as  well  as  job  security. In
this  context  it  can  be shown  that  a relative  debt  price  exists  at  which  no
bank  wishes  to trade. The  result  does  not  depend  on the  bias  introduced  by
minimum  capital  requirements  against  selling  a  country's  debt in  the
secondary  market. Further  assumptions  to  obtain  this  result  are  that  the
returns  to  the  loans  to the  two  countries  are  normally  independently
distributed,  and that  banks  can  change  debt  portfolio's  among  themselves
through  small  but  non-negligible  swJaps.  Loans  to  the  relatively  heavily
indebted  country  can  trade  at  a higher  discount  or lower  relative  price,
depending  on the  realtive  weight  the  managers  attach  to  maximizing  bank
value  anG  safe  guarding  their  own  jobs.
14  The  values  for  wi'  will  be close  to  one  for  small  countries,  as the
repayment  of small  countries  hardly  influences  the  chances  of survival  of
the  bank,  but they  may  be small  for  large  countries.
t5This  quantity  is  given  by ((I-wd  )(l+rf  )/9f  Pi)-((1/0  -l)(l+r  )).
16This is  because  the  bank,  before  as well  as  after  the  purchase,  has
to  guarantee  depositors  an  expected  return  of  r
h  17A sufficient  condition  for  the  capital  requirement  to  be binding  is
r  >  r  e.
18
Note  that  the  price  is  less  than  fifty  cents,  eventhough  the  default
probability  w  is  assumed  to  be 0.50,  as the  rate  the  bank  earns  on
domestic  loans  is  assumed  to  be above  the  rate  earned  on foreign  loans.
One  may  argue  that  the  negative  relation  between  discount  and
exposure  is  because  banks  increase  their  exposure  to low  discount  countries,
reversing  the  causality.  This  argument,  however,  is  not  consistent  with  the
fact  that  banks  stopped  making  new  loans  to  developing  countries. Trading
in the  secondary  markets  followed  this  general  cut  off  of new  loans  to
developing  countries.
20We maintain  that  the  market  value  of bank  preferred  equity,  deposits
and  dommestic  loans  can  be approximated  by book  values. Also  note  that  the
linear  relation  described  for  high  capital  values  would  continue  to  hold if
there  were  no deposit  insurance.29
In this case the  expected value of the bank is given by the following
equation:
KLh  f  1  K2 h  f
EB - [L  +  (1 - 6)L  D  d6 _  ,  as K - L  + L  - D.
0  26L
For  the  derivation  of equation  (10)  also  recall  the  presence  of capital
requirements.
22  Variables  are  measured  as follows:  EB  - market  value  of coomon
equity  calculated  as the  stock  price  times  the  number  of  shares  f
outstanding,  K - book  value  of  comon equity  plusfloanlo5s  reserves,  L  -
book  value  of  developing  country  loan  exposure,  L  + L  - total  assets  plus
loan  loss  reserves.
23  Stock  price  data  are  for  November  31,  1987. All  other  data,  and,  in
particular,  bank  exposure  data,  is  for  the  end  of 1987. The  limitation  to
four  countries  is  because  banks  are  required  to  disclose  developing  country
exposure  to individual  countries  only  if  in excess  of 1  percent  of  assets.
The  banks  in  our  sample  have  all  reported  exposure  to each  of four
countries.
24 Estimation  of (11)  without  the  quadratic  term  yields  an  estimate  of
a of -0.641  with  a t-statistic  of -10.87. Note  that  alternative
specifications  are  possible  where  the  market  value  of,  for  instance,  a
bank's  preferred  equity,  liabilities  or non-LDC  assets  is  left  to  be
determined  by the  data  rather  than  assumed  to  be unity  a  priori. A modified
specif'cation  of (11)  which  leaves  the  value  of non-LDC  assets  unconstrained
(corresponding  to  Sachs  and  Huizinga  (1987)  and  Huizinga  (1989)  yields  that
the  value  of  non-LDC  assets  is  estimated  at 1.00  with  strong  significance.
25Exposure  to  Latin  America  scaled  by exposure  to all  developing
countries  is  approximately  the  same  when  the  largest  banks  are  compared  to
the  smaller  banks:  the  ratio  is .60,  .63,  .61  for  the  top  9,  next  15,  and
the  remaining  near  150  banks  respectively  at the  end  of 1987.
26  Additional  hypotheses  can  be constructed  from  considering  the
bargaining  strenth  of  banks  and  different  kinds  of countries  vis-a-vis  each
other. Without  an explicit  bargaining  model,  however, one  can  not sort  out
the  consequences  of this  approach,30
Table 1.  Sample Characteristics
(1986-1988)
For Countries Whose Assets Are:a
Traded  Not Traded
Standard  Standard
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviatio
Detex  4.08  2.45  2.60  2.14
Resimp  1.16  0.98  0.98  0.72
RGNP  1.23  0.78  1.87  2.00
Inf  b  0.10  0.13  0.02  0.02
InvGNP  0.17  0.05  0.22  0.06
DetGNP  0.74  0.39  0.40  0.16
ResGNP  0.21  0.17  0.39  0.64
ImpGNP  0.23  0.12  0.37  0.36
Agr  c  0.98  0.13  0.02  0.14
Incrat  0.19  0.09  0.09  0.04
Agratc  0.15  0.07  0.20  0.12
Pridebt  4.72  6.48  3.50  4.12
(Variable  definitions  and sources are provided below)
The countries  whose debt is traded in the secondary  market are:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa-Rica, Dominican  Republic,
Ecuador, Honduras, Ivory  Coast, Jamaica, Liberia,  Malawi, Mexico, Moracco,
Panama, Peru, Philippines,  Sudan, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia.
The remaining countries in our sample are:  Cameroon, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia,  Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan,
Kenya, Korea, Pakistan,  Paraguay, Portugal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Zimbabwe.
bThis variable is not available for Argentina, Mcxico, Sudan, Turkey
and Zaire.
cThese series are obtained from Sachs and Berg (1988)  and are not
available for Bolivia, Cameroon, Dominican-Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Greece, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Liberia, Malawi, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Sudan,  Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.31
Table  1 (continued)
Variable  Definitions  and  Sources
(Variables  that  are  not  noted  as  quarterly  are  measured  as  annually)
Detex  Ratio  of total  public  outstanding  debt  to  exports  (exports  are
quarterly)
Resimp  Ratio  of total  reserves  to imports  (both  quarterly)
RGNP  GNP  per  capita  in  thousands  of 1986  U.S.  dollars
Inf  Rate  of inflation  (quarterly)
InvGNP  Ratio  of  domestic  investment  to  GNP
DetGNP  Total  public  debt  to  GNP  ratio
ImpGN°  Imports  to  GNP  ratio  (imports  are  quarterly)
ResGNP  Reserves  to  GNP  ratio  (reserves  are  quarterly)
Agr  A dummy  variable  indicating  that  a country  has signed  a
rescheduling  agreement  with  its  bank  creditors.
Incrat  : A measure  of income  distribution,  defined  as the  ratio  of the
highest  income  quartile  to  the  lowest  income  quartile  for  the
early  1970s. The  variable  is  available  only  for  the  cross-
section  of some  countries.
Agrat:  Agriculture  to  GDP  ratio  averaged  over  the  period  of 1970-1981.
Pridebt: Debt  outstanding  to  private  creditors  in  billions  of U.S.  dollars
(quarterly).
Sources:  International  Financial  Statistics  (IMF),  World  Debt  Tables
(The  World  Bank),  Sachs  and  Berg  (1988).32
Tabl.2.  Secondary  .Market  Discounts  and Bank ExIposure
Country  Discount  Deviation  SRread  Exosure
Argentina  53.34  18.75  2.82  6.52
Bolivia  91.31  2.00  18.32  0.04
Brazil  41.01  13.68  2.42  15.80
Chile  36.94  4.75  2.43  3.89
Colombia  23.93  10.18  2.00  1.45
Costa Rica  70.67  15.16  9.49  0.19
Dominican  Republic  65.42  11.90  7.05  0.28
Ecuador  54.31  19.42  4.30  1.16
Honduras  67.29  8.42  8.46  0.05
Ivory Coast  43.95  21.64  5.56  0.28
Jamaica  59.72  4.99  9.42  0.11
Liberia  91.60  5.12  37.72  0.02
Malawi  2.6.85  1.53  4.40  0.03
Mexico  46.74  5.10  2.38  13.19
Morocco  38.77  9.44  3.16  0.59
Panama  49.14  21.37  5.97  0.51
Peru  87.80  6.41  18.63  0.54
Philippines  40.50  8.29  3.03  3.32
Sudan  95.77  3.74  61.90  0.01
Turkey  2.54  0.65  1.46  1.09
Uruguay  36.12  4.73  2.91  0.67
Venezuela  35.96  12.33  2.14  6.02
Yugoslavia  34.91  15.99  2.46  1.23
Zaire  77.91  2.80  13.88  0.01
Zambia  83.41  3.50  17.47  0.06
Notes :  Discount is the mean of (100-bid  price) for the 1986-88  period.
Deviation is the standard deviation of the discounts.
Spread is calculated  as the percentage difference  between the  bid
and ask prices.
Exposure is for the nine largest  U.S. banks in $
billion.
Sources:  Indicative  Prices for Less DeveloRed  Country Bank Loans, Salomon
Brothers,  various issues,  and Country ExDosure  Lending Survey,
Federal Financial  Ex¢inination  Council,  various issues.33
Table 3: Probit Specification-Model  1 (t-values  are in parentheses)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Pridebt  -'-.?8E-06  .28E-06  .38E-07  .62E-06  .29E-06
(6.86)  (5.89)  (4.64)  (4.46)  (6.84)
Debtexp  .1OE-02  .79E-03  .97E-03  .35E-03  .llE-02
(2.85)  (1.89)  (1.27)  (.35)  (2.98)
Resimp  -. 85E-02  -.79E-02  -.12E-01  .16E-01  -.84E-02
(-6.45)  (-5.71)  (-4.09)  (-4.09)  (-6.23)
Rgnp  -.90  -.60  -2.03  -6.48  -.91
(-5.29)  (-2.83)  (-4.16)  (-5.14)  (-5.16)
Inf  .16  .10  .31  .51  .17
(6.92)  (3.79)  (5.27)  (4.91)  (6.92)
Latin  4.06  4.28  7.86  11.81  4.29
(9.83)  (9.14)  (4.76)  (5.17)  (9.29)
Africa  1.93  1.96  2.35  3.77  2.15







Constant  -1.80  -0.34E-01  -2.44  9.14  -1.92
(-3.40)  (-.49)  (-2.95)  (3.30)  (-3.55)
McFadden
R-Square  .57  .58  .74  .84  .57
% of  Right  .86  .89  .89  .93  .87
Predictions
Nobs.  at 1:  254  187  174  174  239
Nobs.  at  0:  227  215  152  149  227
Not reported here are quarterly dummy variables.  All the ratios are measured in
percentages,  ex9  is the  top  nine  U.S.  bank  exposure  in thousands  of 1986  U.S.$.34
Table  4: Heckman  Equation-Model  1 (t-values  are  in  parentheses)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Lnex9  -.13  -. 17  -. 14  -. 16  -. 5E-01
(-6.52)  (-6.97)  (-3.35)  (-2.70)  (-1.96)
Lnk9  3.48  2.75  3.56  4.31  2.65
(3.50)  (3.56)  (2.81)  (3.44)  (2.72)
Pridebt  .83E-08  .15E-07  .1lE-07  .1OE-07  -. 67E-09
(1.54)  (2.39)  (1.62)  (1.32)  (-.13)
Debtexp  .38E-03  .35E-03  .1lE-03  .24E-03  .25E-03
(3.46)  (2.39)  (.53)  (1.50)  (2.17)
Resimp  -. 61E-03  -. 32E-03  -. 15E-02  -. 43E-03  -. 73E-03
(-1.84)  (-.71)  (-2.09)  (-1.09)  (-2.53)
Rgnp  -. 61E-01  -. 14  -.70E-01  -. 23  -. 50E-01
(-1.04)  (-2.96)  (-1.13)  (  4.26)  (-l.Cl)
Inf  .IOE-01  .56E-02  .12E-01  .79E-02  .86E-02
(4.20)  (2.90)  (4.27)  (3.28)  (3.43)
Latin  1.11  .28  1.71  .88  .91
(4.31)  (1.57)  (4.61)  (3.44)  (3.97)
Africa  .76  -. 17  .64  .55  .61
(3.01)  (-1.65)  (2.76)  (2.11)  (2.83)
Invgnp  -.86E-02
(-1.34)




Agrat  -. 40E-01
(-7.20)
Millsinv  .13  .11  .78  .27  .62E-01
(.67)  (.81)  (3.03)  (.88)  (.33)
Constant  -57.00  -42.26  -58.28  -70.45  -43.29
(-3.24)  (-3.13)  (-2.61)  (-3.34)  (-2.50)
Adj.  R-sqr.  .39  .45  .37  .36  .48
*
Dependent  variable  for  5 is  log(100-bidprice),  for  others  bid and  ask  average  is
used.  See  also  the  notes  to  Table  3.  Lnk9  is the  log  of  capital  for  9 banks.35
Table  5:  Probit  Specification-Model  2 (t-values  are in  parentheses)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Pridebt  -.  53E-06  .llE-06  .17E-05  .55E-06
(5.35)  (3.85)  (2.99)  (5.28)
Debtgnp  .17  .31  .15  .42  .18
(5.86)  (3.93)  (4.85)  (2.67)  (5.60)
Resgnp  -.83E-01  -. 85E-01  -.17E-01  -. 24  -. 83E-01
(-3.94)  (-2.24)  (-.84)  (-2.94)  (-3.85)
Impgnp  -. 67E-01  -. 79E-01  -. 13  .12  -. 71E-01
(-2.71)  (-1.65)  (-2.31)  (1.45)  (-2.76)
Rgnp  -. 62  -1.07  -.32E-01  -16.13  -. 59
(-1.75)  (-1.56)  (-.061)  (-2.88)  (-1.66)
Inf  .46  .77  .49  1.99  .47
(5.12)  (3.49)  (4.08)  (2.92)  (5.00)
Latin  5.65  10.53  1.53  3.03  5.84
(5.41)  (3.81)  (1.06)  (2.99)  (5.27)
Africa  1.41  1.30  -4.70  1.43  1.43
(1.65)  (0.97)  (-3.51)  (.70)  (1.51)






Constant  -10.46  -14.76  -10.49  -0.41  -11.29
(-5.04)  (-0.50)  (-3.79)  (-.50)  (-4.88)
McFadden
R-Square  .86  .92  .89  .90  .85
%  of Right  .95  .97  .96  .97  .96
Predictions
Nobs.  at 1:  256  189  176  176  241
N*bs.  at  0:  227  215  152  152  227
See  notes  to  Table  336
Table  6:  Heckman  Equation-Model  2 (t  values  are  in  parentheses,
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Lnex9  -. 11  -.15  -.11  -. 17  -. 32E-01
(-At.95)  (-6.43)  (-2.83)  (-2.27)  (-2.05)
Lnk9  2.87  2.38  5.25  4.34  2.39
(3.56)  (3.38)  (4.92)  (3.94)  (2.72)
Pridebt  .13E-08  .98E-08  .14E-07  -. 57E-08
(.27)  (1.84)  (1.69)  (-1.01)
Debtgnp  .51E-02  .79E-02  .14E-01  .11E-01  .50E-02
(4.18)  (6.45)  (5.50)  (3.80)  (4.30)
Resgnp  -. 35E-02  - 24E-02  -. 65E.02  -.35E-02  .29E-02
(-2.46)  (-1.63)  (-2.31)  (-1.49)  (-2.62)
Impgnp  -.85E-02  .llE-01  - .66E-02  -. 14E-01  -. 60E-02
(-2.55)  (-.62)  (-1.07)  (-2.03)
Rgnp  -. 27E-01  . .01  -. 88E-01  -. 41E-01  -. 1lE-01
(-  .45)  . .26)  (-1.36)  (-.48)  (-.22)
Inf  .56E-02  .42E-02  .14E-01  .52E-02  .52E-02
(2.62)  (2.14)  (3.62)  (1.97)  (2.65)
Latin  .68  -. 33E-01  1.30  .43  .58
(2.94)  (-.35)  (4.10)  (1.55)  (2.86)
Africa  .24  -. 58  .43  -. 55E-01  .19
(.96)  (-6.47)  (1.76)  (-.18)  (.88)
Invgnp  -.lOE-01
(-1.97)




Agrat  -. 25E-01
(-3.17)
Millsinv  -. 60  -.31  1.63  -. 72  -. 40
(-2.19)  (-2.70)  (5.07)  (-1.67)  (-1.60)
Constant  -46.66  -35.98  -48.22  -50.66  -38.49
-3.48)  (-2.94)  (-4.45)  (-3.66)  (-2.48)
4dj.R-Square .45  .59  .52  .41  .52
See  notes  to  Table  4.37
Table 7.  Simulations for  Alternative Parameter  Valuesa
b  CA)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Results
xh  88.9  55.7  51.2  86.3  88.3
EB  19.9  11.4  10.8  19.3  19.8
EL  3.5  6.1  8.0  4.0  0
Lh  644.6  644.6  439.6  468.4  644.6
D  662.7  662.7  470.0  486.5  622.7
re  8.3  8.5  8.7  8.3  8.4
Secondary  Market Prices:  Cents on one $U.S.
Argentina  52.23  33.47  56.59  52.09
Bolivia  49.91  29.98  49.92  49.90
Brazil  54.36  45.07  66.62  55.40
Chile  51.34  32.31  53.97  51.21
Colombia  50.60  31.24  52.00  50.56
Costa Rica  49.98  30.13  50.17  49.96
Dominican  Republic  50.02  30.20  50.22  49.99
Ecuador  50.30  31.87  51.21  50.30
Honduras  49.91  29.97  49.94  49.90
Ivory  Coast  49.80  30.15  50.22  49.97
Jamaica  49.95  30.06  50.03  49.92
Liberia  49.93  30.01  49.99  49.91  49.88
Malawi  49.91  29.97  49.93  49.89
Mexico  54.56  43.64  62.79  55.42
Morocco  50.13  30.32  50.61  50.13
Panama  50.17  30.44  50.65  50.10
Peru  50.23  30.63  50.83  50.18
Philippines  51.18  30.044  42.66  50.99
Sudan  49.91  29.96  49.94  49.90
Turkey  50.35  30.89  51.49  50.35
Uruguay  50.16  30.27  50.61  50.08
Venezuela  52.76  34.07  57.98  52.46
Yugoslavia  50.40  30.97  51.43  50.35
Zaire  49.89  29.94  49.89  49.88
Zambia  49.89  29.97  49.97  49.8938
a
Parameters  for  columni  (1)  (bill  Year  1985)
K  - $42.3,  capital  for  the  top  9  money-center  banks
h 9  - .06,  current  capital  requirement  for  domestic  loans  in the  U.S.
f
r  - 9.11%,  1-year  Libor  rate  (7.61)  plus  a  spread  of 1.5%
r  - 10.87%,  ex-post  return  on domestic  loans  (net  of loss  provisions  for
U.S.  banks.
r  - 8.29  actual  rate  paid  for  all  liabilities  by insured  comercial
d  banks.
n  _ 0.50
ds  - .75
Parameters  for  columns  (2)-(5)  d
All  parameters  are  as in  column  (1)  except  in  column 2)  t  _ .7,  in (3)  K  -
h  f
$30.0  billion,  in (4)  91  and  9  are  0.08  and  in (5) ds  - 0.
b Notation
-h  - probability  of  bank  survival,  percent
EB  - expected  value  of the  bank ($  billion)
EL  - exoected  loss  of  deposit  agency  ($  billion)
L  - volume  of domestic  lending  ($  billion)
D  - volume  of liabilities  or deposits  ($  billion)
re  - average  effective  deposiP  rate,  percent.
Notes: We  made  a downward  adjustment  income  equivalent  to 1.85  cents  per  dollar
of assets. This  adjustment  is  to account  for  non-interest  expenses.
Sources: Federal  Reserve  Financial  Examination  Council,  Country  Exposure
Lending. "The  Profitability  of Insured  Commercial  Banks  in 1987,"
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  v.  7n,  #7,  .uly  1988.39
Table  8
Secondary  Market  Discounts  and  Bank  Capital
Year  Quarter  Discount  Capital
1986  1  44.8  44.3
2  44.9  44.3
3  45.1  45.0
4  45.1  46.1
1987  1  43.7  47.8
2  47.1  49.1
3  52.8  ;.9.8
4  59.6  50.1
1988  1  60.9  50.1
2  61.4  50.6
3  62.3  50.9
4  64.7  52.0
ootes: Discounts  are  calculated  as the  average  of  bid  and  ask  prices.
Capital  includes  equity,  subordianted  debentures  and  reserves  for  loan
losses. The figures  are  for  the  nine  largest  U.S.  banks  in  1986  U.S.
$  bill.40
Tab'-  '4 Stock Market Valuation
A  Estirrated  equation (11):  Method OLS
-00  a()  1  'Nobs. Adj R2
-1 05?  7.099  23  0.46
(-6.43)  (2.67)
B.  Implied  Marginal Discounts for U.S. Banks.
Bank  Exposure to  Exposure to Latin four/  Marginal
Latin four  assets plus loan  discount
(millions)  loss reserves
(percentage)
Citicorp  9,100  4.37  -0.41
Chase Manhattan  6,440  6.32  -0.31
BankAmerica  7,025  7.31  -0.26
Chemical  4,401  5.48  -0.36
J.P. Morgan  4,350  5.64  -0.35
Man. Hanover  6,571  8.65  -0.19
Sec. Pacific  1,558  2.09  -0.53
Bankers Trust  2,778  4.81  -0.39
First Interstate  1,047  2.01  -0.54
First  Chicago  2,237  4.89  -0.39
Wells Fargo  1,542  3.39  -0,47
PNC Financial  322  0.87  -0.60
Bank of Boston  851  2.44  -0.52
Mellon  1,111  3.51  -0.46
Bank of New Eng.  261  0.87  -0.60
First Bank System  307  1.13  -0.59
Irving  Bank  1,391  5.74  '0.34
Bank of N.Y.  533  2.27  -0.52
Republic N.Y.  455  2.01  -0.54
Norwest  285  1.35  -0.57
Midlantic  261  1.45  -0.57
National City  196  1.29  -0.58
Mercantile Bank  188  2.71  -0.50
Notes: Marginal discouts are for total developing  country exposure of U.S. banks.
To obtain this quantity, the parameter estimates  for  a,  and a ,  as well as the
exposure to Latin four/  assets ratio in the second column are adjusted.  The
factor  used for this adjustment is 0.61, which is the share of  the Latin four in
the  exposure of all  U.S. banks in 1987 to all developing countries.
Sources: 10-K reports, Salomon Brothers'  Review of  Bank Performance, and the Wall
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